

ADELAIDE INSTITUTE

PO Box 3300
Adelaide 5067
Australia

Mob: 61+401692057

Email: info@adelaideinstitute.org

Web: <http://www.adelaideinstitute.org>

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April 2014 No 756

Vietnam is sentencing corrupt bankers to death, by firing squad *Others just get life behind bars.*

Patrick Winn April 3, 2014 00:33

BANGKOK — For the most part, American bankers whose rash pursuit of profit brought on the 2008 global financial collapse didn't get indicted. They got bonuses. Odds are that scandal would have played out differently in Vietnam, another nation struggling with misbehaving bankers.

The authoritarian Southeast Asian state doesn't just send unscrupulous financiers to jail. Sometimes, it sends them to death row.

Amid a sweeping cleanup of its financial sector, Vietnam has sentenced three bankers to death in the past six months.

One duo now on death row [embezzled roughly \\$25 million](#) from the state-owned Vietnam Agribank. Their co-conspirators caught decade-plus prison sentences.

In March, a 57-year-old former regional boss from Vietnam Development Bank, another government-run bank, was [sentenced to death](#) over a \$93-million swindling job.



Duong Chi Dung (C-front), 56, former chairman of Vinalines, and his accomplices listen to the verdict at a local People's Court in Hanoi on December 16, 2013. Two top executives were sentenced to death for embezzlement as authorities try to allay rising public anger over corruption. Three corrupt bankers have also recently received the death sentence.

Staff/AFP/Getty Images

According to Vietnam's Tuoi Tre news outlet, several of his colluders were sentenced to life imprisonment after they confessed to securing bogus loans with a diamond ring and a BMW coupe. And last week, in an unrelated case, charges against senior employees from the same bank allege \$47 million in losses from dubious loans.

None of this would impress Bernie Madoff, mastermind of America's largest ever financial fraud scheme. The combined amount from all three Vietnamese cases adds up to less than 1 percent of his purported \$18-billion haul.

But these death sentences nevertheless are high profile scandals in Vietnam.

That's the point. Human rights watchdogs contend that splashy trials in Vietnam are acts of political theater with predetermined conclusions. The audience: a Vietnamese public weary of state corruption. But these sentences also sound loud alarm bells to dodgy bankers who are currently running scams.

"It's a message to those in this game to be less greedy and that business as usual is getting out of hand," said Adam McCarty, chief economist with the Hanoi-based consulting firm Mekong Economics.

"The message to people in the system is this: Your chances of getting caught are increasing," McCarty said. "Don't just rely on big people above you. Because some of these [perpetrators] would've had big people above them. And it didn't help them."

Like most nations that crush dissent and operate with little transparency, Vietnam is highly corrupt.

According to a World Bank study, half of all businesses operating within the communist state expect that gift giving toward officials is required "to get things done." Transparency International, which publishes the world's leading corruption gauge, contends Vietnam is more corrupt than Mexico but not quite as bad as Russia.

Unlike in America, where judges can't sentence white-collar criminals to death, Vietnam can execute its citizens for a range of corporate crimes.

Amnesty International reports that [death sentences](#) in Vietnam have been handed down to criminals for running shady investment schemes, counterfeiting cash and even defaulting on loans. This is unusual: United Nations officials have condemned death for "economic crimes" yet Vietnam persists with these sentences — as does neighboring China.

Though statistics on Vietnam's opaque justice system are scarce, a state official conceded that [more than 675 people sit on death row](#) for a range of crimes, according to the Associated Press.

It's still unclear how the bankers will be killed. Vietnam's traditional means of execution involves binding perpetrators to a wooden post, stuffing their mouths with lemons and calling in a firing squad. The nation [wants to transition to lethal injections](#). But European nations refuse to export chemicals used in executions (namely sodium thiopental) to governments practicing capital punishment.

Fraudulent bankers are receiving heavy sentences at a moment when Vietnam is enacting major financial reforms.

For decades, Vietnam has been slowly transforming its communist-style, state-run market into a more open and competitive arena. In the post-reunification era, the government owned every bank in Vietnam. Today, state-run banks control only 40 percent of all assets. This push to bank in a more Western style has ushered in improvements as well as temptations to swindle. [According to the UN economist Vu Quang Viet](#), Vietnamese credit laws passed in 2010 "simply copied the lax US law now widely believed to be at least partially responsible for the financial debacle in 2008." Campaigns to root out corruption are promoted as a way to entice foreign investment, which could help prop up Vietnamese banks whose growth has slowed from a sprint to a jog. But the recent death sentences aren't really intended to prove the reformers' sincerity to the outside world, according to McCarty.

"They don't care about foreigners. It's all internal politics," McCarty said. Foreign banking honchos wouldn't be impressed by a few executions anyway. "If you really want to want to resolve the problem, you can't just arrest people," he said. "You've got to improve accountability and transparency in the entire system."

A leading Vietnamese newspaper, Thanh Nien, is also pushing for system-wide cleanup in lieu of showcase trials against a few corporate criminals.

An op-ed in the paper recently compared death sentences for corruption to [fighting fire with fire](#). The preferred approach would be dousing corruption before it burns through public funds. "It is better to prevent corruption," the paper opined, "than deal with it after the fact."

<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/vietnam/140402/vietnam-s-solution-corrupt-bankers-firing-squads>

**A fundamental question never asked:
WHAT IS THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER?**

In the following 2008 ADL sketch of David DEES' art work the label "anti-Semite" is liberally used but never is the question asked: Is there truth in what Dees is depicting? Instead, the obsession with Talmudic-inspired hatred finds fertile ground.



COMBATING HATE: DOMESTIC EXTREMISM & TERRORISM

David Dees: Conspiratorial Artist

June 20, 2008

David Dees, a Louisville, Kentucky-based graphic artist, has found a large audience for his anti-Semitic and conspiratorial art. This artwork has been circulated on extremist email groups, published on the Websites of 9/11 conspiracy theorists and turned into videos posted on YouTube and other Websites. A biography of Dees posted to his Website claims that his images are "an attempt to wake others up about the onslaught of the elite's power hungry world government plan of domination."

A great deal of Dees' art is overtly anti-Semitic and many of his images promote Holocaust denial. In one image, prisoners are disembarking from a train at Auschwitz. In the foreground a man holds a placard reading "What really happened?" while "Truth does not fear investigation" - a line used by Holocaust deniers - is written on the side of a cattle car. In another image a prisoner jailed for having "asked for proof of 6 million gassed during Holocaust" is imprisoned between a "serial rapist" and a "murderer." Faceless guards are dressed in riot control outfits with a Star of David with the letter Z at its center on their chests and Israeli police badges on their sleeves. Another image depicts a woman being zapped by a laser gun by the same faceless guards as she reads a book entitled *Did Six Million Really Die?*

In yet another, Dees uses pictures of the gas chambers at Auschwitz and promotes the lie that Zyklon-B gas was used to kill lice, not people, in Auschwitz, which he asserts has been proven by "scientific testing." This falsehood is at the heart of many Holocaust deniers' propaganda. In the same image, Dees alleges that it is the "Zionists" who claim the gas was used "to exterminate millions of Jews," again suggesting that the Holocaust is a myth created by those who wanted to establish a Jewish state.

The Star of David with the letter Z (most likely referring to Zionists) at its center is a mainstay in Dees' anti-Semitic images, whether on the uniforms of the faceless guards, within a red mushroom cloud hovering over an American city, on a

pendant on the wrist of California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (who wears a Nazi badge on his lapel), or in a dark sky over the chained wrists of an Arab child. In the context of Dees' images, the Star of David with the letter Z suggests Jewish control over individuals and world events.

In another anti-Semitic image, Ariel Sharon, the former Israeli Prime Minister, is shown standing in a pool of American soldiers' blood next to Dick Cheney, a tiny George Bush in Sharon's jacket pocket.

Dees' bio claims that his blatantly anti-Semitic images, which question the Holocaust or suggest that Jews control the government or world events, are "Pro-Jewish, but extremely Anti-Zionist."

He does not limit himself to the creation of anti-Semitic images. Promoting his art as "satire," he has posted images to his Websites depicting President Bush as a bumbling leader and Americans as overweight, addicted to fast food, and misinformed by mainstream media. In dozens of other conspiratorial images hosted on additional pages of his Websites or elsewhere, Dees criticizes Bush, Dick Cheney, and other American leaders with gruesome imagery, accusing them of murdering Iraqis and Americans and butchering the United States Constitution. Many of the images also promote some of the more popular current Internet conspiracy theories, including the idea that the American government staged the 9/11 terrorist attacks, that a secret group known as the Bilderbergs controls world events, and that "chemtrails" (the lines of exhaust left in the sky by passenger airplanes) spread deadly illnesses.

Rense, a Website that posts anti-Semitic material, maintains an extensive and regularly updated archive of Dees' images and often posts a Dees image on its front page. Rense also provides links to virulent anti-Semitic writings hosted on other Websites, including a post by the "dancing street preacher" Brother Nathanael Kapner accusing Jews of creating a "Jewish police state" in America, and Judicial-Inc, which on a daily

basis updates its collection of posts accusing Jews of plotting every perceived ill in the world, from the mistreatment of Native Americans to the promulgation of pornography to even being Jack the Ripper, a late 19th century English serial killer. Both of Dees' own Websites link directly to Rense and have advised visitors, "This art is free to use for non-profit purposes, and I encourage you to openly distribute to others with the hope it will educate, enlighten, deprogram, and at least, entertain." Dees has also contributed the artwork and

cover illustrations for *Republic*, an anti-government, conspiratorial magazine.

Dees, who calls himself a "freelance artist and illustrator," claims to have over 20 years of experience as a graphic artist.

<http://www.adl.org/combatinghate/domesticextremism-terrorist/c/david-dees-conspiratorial.html>

Judge for yourself and view his works at:

<http://www.deesillustration.com/>

Gender ruling:

Australian High Court recognises third category of sex

2 April 2014

The High Court has ruled New South Wales laws do permit the registration of a third category of sex other than male or female.

Sydney resident Norrie was born male but had a sex change and now does not identify as specifically male or female.

Norrie has been fighting the NSW Registrar of Births Deaths and Marriages to have a sex change formally registered as 'non-specific'. When Norrie applied for a name change and to be registered as being of non-specific sex in 2010, the registrar at first agreed.

But that recognition was revoked, with the registrar arguing it was beyond the power of the law to recognise options other than male or female.

Norrie went on to challenge the decision and last year the NSW Court of Appeal found the existing law could recognise additional options.

The registrar turned to the High Court in an attempt to have that decision overturned, but today the court dismissed the appeal. It reached the unanimous decision that the law does recognise a person may be neither male nor female. The court ordered Norrie's application for registration be remitted to the registrar for determination.

*



It's important for people to have equal rights in society and if some people are granted the right to have their sex and certain benefits that go along with that then why shouldn't everyone have that right? - Norrie

*

Norrie, who had been quietly confident of winning the case, says it is a big win for the wider transgender community.

"I tried to keep an open mind about it but I wasn't entirely surprised by the verdict today. I'm overjoyed that it has happened, it happened so swiftly and decisively," Norrie said.

"It's important for people to have equal rights in society and if some people are granted the right to have their sex and certain benefits that go along with that then why shouldn't everyone have that right?"

"Why should people be left out because they're not seen as male or female? They should be recognised as whatever they are and allowed to participate in society at an equal level."

The state's Attorney-General is not commenting on the High Court decision.

A spokeswoman says the Government is considering the judgement and any legal and policy implications.

Amnesty says more needs to be done Amnesty International's Senthoran Raj says the High Court's decision is promising but there is further to go. He says the decision means people in New South Wales who have had a surgical procedure will be able to amend their birth certificate, but it will still be difficult for people who have not had surgery.

"You can amend your birth certificate where you've undergone a particular sex affirmation procedure, but the concern is obviously that it comes back to showing that you've undertaken medical or surgical treatment that you can demonstrate that you're no longer within a male or female category in order to be considered sex-not-specified," he said.

"And you also need to be single, so obviously it doesn't really give the same rights to people who can't afford to or don't want to engage in surgical procedures in order to have their sex documentation or gender documentation amended."

Other states urged to recognise personal identification

The ACT recently passed a law recognising a third category of sex and the Commonwealth is rolling out a set of guidelines for government departments to also allow similar recognition.

Today's ruling has been hailed as a victory for the wider transgender and intersex community.

"The High Court...has set some really important guidance for every other state and territory jurisdiction," said Sam Rutherford from A Gender Agenda.

"We're very glad for Norrie that a lot of years of determination and probably a lot of stress in taking her fight all the way to the High Court has finally paid off."

Mr Rutherford says he is confident the progressive ruling will speed up change across the country.

"The High Court is the highest court that we have, they've made very clear indications in their judgement that people of non-binary gender identities are in the community and they need to be recognised legally," he said.

"It will certainly be difficult for other state legislators not to pay attention to it."

Mr Rutherford says they are particularly happy with the term 'non-specific'.

"The High Court was really clear that [the term] needs to be as inclusive as possible, and anyone that falls outside that male-female binary needs to be recognised and non-specific is the best way to do that," he said.

"It could be an intersex person, it could be a transgender person, it could be a someone whose identity is neither male or female. But the really important thing is that it is about personal identification by that person, rather than letting the registrar make the decision."

He says identity recognition is a fundamental human right.

"This judgement is affirming on a personal level for people," he said. "We're seeing more and more people identifying as androgynous or neither male nor female, particularly younger people. So this is going to be really important for them to have this decision as a precedent."

[AUDIO: Sex not just male or female: High Court\(The World Today\)](http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-02/high-court-recognises-gender-neutral/5361362)

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-02/high-court-recognises-gender-neutral/5361362>

Comments:

greg777 - 3:02 PM on 02/04/2014

really? we are born male or females, we are mammals, at birth we are male or female determined by our physical structure, yes persons may have issues with genes or chromosome or mental illness, but we are what we are, no different to catagorising other species. I gather next will be the requirement for seperate facilities for this new group,

toilets, wording documentation the list is endless, the door has been opened to a logistical nightmare for a very small minority, no doubt affirmative action will get a run to.....

sakel - 3:57 PM on 02/04/2014

There are an awfully large number of people here who don't seem to know the difference between sex and gender.. Sex is the 'biological' part of it.. Gender is what's between your ears. There are several theories with some research and other scientific data that show that your sex and gender are not always the same. And it happens in other animals species too, just like homosexuality.

Just because trans people don't meet your ideas of what 'normal' is, doesn't actually make them not 'normal'..

Oh and while I think about it.. I know a lovely woman, except for one thing, her chromosome pairing is XY - that's right, that's a typically male chromosome pairing. She has Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, which means she has NO ability to process testosterone. So there's just one example of how chromosomes don't truly define the person..

Rinaldo - 3:36 PM on 02/04/2014

If this is a medical condition then the person isn't really 'neutral' gender. They could in theory be medically altered to either be male or female. That's the implication of those advocating that this is all a matter of medicine, and not a choice. Of course if you want to argue it's a choice then they could choose to be either male or female.

Either way there are no grounds for this person being their own separate gender other than a bunch of people thinking respect is about allowing people to do whatever they want.

Rinaldo - 1:37 PM on 02/04/2014

This person has done this to themselves. Rather than getting help, they've had encouragement. And now the law has been changed for one person.

It's also of interest to note that in the current debate over same-sex marriage that this person is outside of that, because they've put themselves in a totally unique category. Maybe we'll have a 'no gender' marriage lobby group.

Tazzietiger - 2:49 PM on 02/04/2014

Australian researcher Professor Vincent Harley found that the transsexual subjects were more likely to have a longer version of the androgen receptor gene in their DNA. The researchers found that the transsexual subjects were more likely to have a longer version of the androgen receptor gene in their DNA.

Lauren Hare, a researcher at Prince Henry's Institute said: "We think these genetic differences might reduce testosterone action and under-masculinise the brain during fetal development."

Professor Harley said:

"Studies in cells show the longer version of the androgen receptor gene works less efficiently at communicating the testosterone message to cells. Based on these studies, we speculate the longer version may also work less efficiently in the brain."

The report stated:

"It is possible that a decrease in testosterone levels in the brain during development might result in incomplete masculinisation of the brain in male to female transsexuals, resulting in a more feminised brain and [later] a female gender identity." In other words, a person can have a male body and a female brain.

Retsy - 2:29 PM on 02/04/2014

Serious question, what is now the appropriate pronoun? Third person, singular pronouns include: he, she, it, him, her, it. Plural includes they and them

On that grammar rule, Sam Rutherford should have used "it"? Seems a bit pejorative as a word, what do you think?

johno42 - 2:24 PM on 02/04/2014

I applaud the decision.

I also wonder why there is so much hate and vitriol about the decision that only helps a minority in our society without causing any harm to the vast majority of people who are not effected by this decision.

To give recognition that not all people fit into comfortable stereotypes is an excellent outcome. The outcome doesn't harm or remove anything from those who are comfortable with their association with male and female.

Is Australia becoming again a country which shuns those who are different? Doing that is no different to the White Australia policy of the past.

simonp38 - 1:22 PM on 02/04/2014

What a stupid decision.

Mr Norrie was born a man. His operations do not change the fact that he is a man. He can never be other. Just because he as a particular psychological problem does not mean that the rest of the world needs should share in his Psychosis.

Clearly there are children born with chromosomal conditions causing intersex issues. This is not the case with Mr Norrie. - If it were it would have been stated.

jaden62 - 1:23 PM on 02/04/2014

Just curious. If Norrie has been declared to be "gender neutral", why is Sam Rutherford referring to them as "she". Surely that then says that Norrie is identifying as being female. Does this mean a new set of terminology needs to be developed that describes someone who is neither male or female, or that the term "they" should be used?

child_doctor - 1:17 PM on 02/04/2014

It is saddening that in 2014, in a first world country that there are so many vocal, narrow minded and clearly uneducated people out there.

Not every person is as lucky as all of you bigots, ie you and yours -lucky to be born with clearly defined XX or XY genetics, clearly defined anatomy, all the needed hormones and without your gender identity not matching your anatomy.

Humans have never been only in these male/female categories. Some of my patients who are biological hermaphrodites are both, societal attitudes are the source of their torture, not their bodies. There are many many variations. Your closed minded attitudes together with every form with a male / female category is a needless source of extreme misery.

A third category has always been necessary, for whatever reason, I welcome this progress, broaden your horizons for those less fortunate than you.

eskimo joe - 1:14 PM on 02/04/2014

I think the High Court should be put in a straight-jacket and sent to a mentally challenged institution for treatment of chronic insanity.

Williamlw - 12:59 PM on 02/04/2014

Intersex is a recognised medical condition, so it is possible to be neither male nor female. Given that our society identifies two genders, most of us identify as one or the other. This is fine if we can fit into this binary system, but some intersex people can't. I don't see where selfishness comes into it, nor is who pays for it relevant - consideration of a basic legal principle should not be determined by 'who pays' and is not a waste of time. People's response to questions of sex and gender is always interesting, and often says more about the person than the question.

Archstanton - 12:36 PM on 02/04/2014

The problem with individuals who identify as transgendered is that biologically those individuals remain the physical beings they were born as. They can talk loudly and proudly as they like about what or who they are, but talking does not change biological reality.

The real-world outcome of a so-called "sex change operation" is far from the ideal, and the term of reference itself is false and misleading. Biologically there is no such thing as a change of sex nor a transgendered person. If you were born male and later in life have your genitalia surgically altered to form a vulva / vagina, and you get breast implants, collagen injections for your lips, and take female hormones --- you are still a male human. No change of gender takes place. No man truly becomes a woman. A male transgendered to female has no womb, no ovaries, and cannot conceive or give birth to children. The same applies to persons born female who have themselves surgically altered to become male. Their bodies are altered cosmetically, but sexually speaking they remain female since they do not possess gonads and cannot produce spermatazoa.

But to claim you are neither male nor female --- is Norrie simply confused, or is Norrie mentally ill? I'm not saying that's the case, I'm asking. Just asking. As long as all people are equal under the law, Norrie is free to be what Norrie is, and should be given equal rights.

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-02/high-court-recognises-gender-neutral/5361362>

Mornings with Steve Austin - 8:30am - 11:00am
Human Rights Commissioner Tim Wilson

07 March 2014, 11:46 AM by Bernadette Young

Do you really support freedom of speech?

In other words are you prepared to let someone be totally offensive ... say things you find appalling... and yet say it is more important that they have a right to be offensive rather than have their ideas unspoken?

There are many restrictions on what you and I can say.

The man charged with monitoring and protecting free speech is Human Rights Commissioner Tim Wilson.

He spoke with Steve Austin.

[Download audio](#)

Comments

You can follow this conversation by subscribing to the [comment feed](#) for this post.

If offensive speech occurs, then let defamation laws come into effect, not per the RDA under which truth is no defence.

Posted by: Fredrick Toben | [08 March 2014 at 08:03 AM](#)

<http://blogs.abc.net.au/queensland/2014/03/human-rights-commissioner-tim-wilson.html>

Oliver Stone:

Jewish control of the media is preventing free Holocaust debate

Outspoken Hollywood director says new film aims to put Adolf Hitler, who he has called an 'easy scapegoat' in the past, in his due historical context.

By Haaretz Service | Jul. 26, 2010 | 9:48 AM

Jewish control of the media is preventing an open discussion of the Holocaust, prominent Hollywood director Oliver Stone told the Sunday Times, adding that the U.S. Jewish lobby was controlling Washington's foreign policy for years.

In the Sunday interview, Stone reportedly said U.S. public opinion was focused on the Holocaust as a result of the "Jewish domination of the media," adding that an upcoming film of his aims to put Adolf Hitler and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin "in context."

"There's a major lobby in the United States," Stone said, adding that "they are hard workers. They stay on top of every comment, the most powerful lobby in Washington."

The famed Hollywood director of such films as "Platoon" and "JFK," also said that while "Hitler was a Frankenstein," there was also a "Dr Frankenstein."

"German industrialists, the Americans and the British. He had a lot of support," Stone told the Sunday Times, adding that "Hitler did far more damage to the Russians than the Jewish people, 25 or 30 [million killed]."

Referring to the alleged influence of the powerful Jewish lobby on U.S. foreign policy, Stone said that Israel had distorted "United States foreign policy for years," adding he felt U.S. policy toward Iran was "horrible."

"Iran isn't necessarily the good guy," Stone said, insisting that Americans did not "know the full story."

Stone's comments to the Sunday times echo previous remarks by the Hollywood director, regarding what he perceives as the distorted view of figures such as Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin in U.S. media.

Earlier this year, Stone, speaking at the Television Critics Association's semi-annual press tour in Pasadena said that "Hitler is an easy scapegoat throughout history and it's been used cheaply."

"He's the product of a series of actions. It's cause and effect ... People in America don't know the connection between World War I and World War II," Stone said, adding that through his documentary work he has been able to "walk in Stalin's shoes and Hitler's shoes to understand their point of view."

"We're going to educate our minds and liberalize them and broaden them. We want to move beyond opinions ... Go into the funding of the Nazi party. How many American corporations were involved, from GM through IBM. Hitler is just a man who could have easily been assassinated," Stone said.

<http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/oliver-stone-jewish-control-of-the-media-is-preventing-free-holocaust-debate-1.304108>

Israel Charged with War Crimes and Genocide. Complete Judgment of Kuala Lumpur Tribunal

By [Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal](#)

Global Research, November 26, 2013, KIWCT

"The perpetrators had committed acts against the Palestinians, with intent to kill, cause serious bodily or mental harms and deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Palestinians as a whole or in part."

"The Tribunal recommends to the War Crimes Commission to give the widest international publicity to this conviction and grant of reparations, as these are universal crimes for which there is a responsibility upon nations to institute prosecutions."

The Tribunal deploras the failure of international institutions to punish the State of Israel for its crimes and its total lack of respect of International Law and the institutions of the United Nations.”.

THE KUALA LUMPUR WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

20 – 25 NOVEMBER 2013

Case No. 3 – CHG – 2013

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission

Against

Amos Yaron

Case No. 4 – CHG – 2013

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission

Against

The State of Israel . .

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal (Tribunal) reconvened on 20 November 2013 to hear two charges against Amos Yaron (first Defendant) and the State of Israel (second Defendant). The first Defendant was charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, whilst the second Defendant was charged with the crime of genocide and war crimes.

The charge against the first Defendant is as follows –

“The Defendant Amos Yaron perpetrated War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide in his capacity as the Commanding Israeli General in military control of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Israeli occupied Lebanon in September of 1982 when he knowingly facilitated and permitted the large-scale Massacre of the Residents of those two camps in violation of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907; the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949; the 1948 Genocide Convention; the Nuremberg Charter (1945), the Nuremberg Judgment (1946), and the Nuremberg Principles (1950); customary international law, jus cogens, the Laws of War, and International Humanitarian Law”

The charge against the second Defendant [State of Israel] is as follows –

“From 1948 and continuing to date the State of Israel (hereafter ‘the Defendant’) carried out against the Palestinian people a series of acts namely killing, causing serious bodily harm and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction.

The conduct of the Defendant was carried out with the intention of destroying in whole or in part the Palestinian people. These acts were carried out as part of a manifest pattern of similar conduct against the Palestinian people.

These acts were carried out by the Defendant through the instrumentality of its representatives and agents including those listed in Appendices 1 and 2.

Such conduct constitutes the Crime of Genocide under international law including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 1948 (‘the Genocide Convention’) in particular Article II and punishable under Article III of the said Convention.

It also constitutes the crime of genocide as stipulated in Article 10 of the Charter of the Kuala Lumpur Foundation to Criminalise War.

Such conduct by the Defendant as an occupying power also violates customary international law as embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

Such conduct also constitutes War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity under international law.”

The charges (together with the particulars of the charges) had been duly served on the Defendants, and were read in open court by the Registrar as these proceedings commenced.

Neither Defendant was present in these proceedings, but both were represented by the Amicus Curiae-Defence Team.

[Read Complete Judgment \(pdf\)](#)

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission (KLWCC) versus the State of Israel

The proceedings directed against the State of Israel were led by the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission.

Members of the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission (KLWCC) are:

Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (Chairman), Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, Dr. Denis Halliday, Mr. Musa Ismail, Dr. Zulaiha Ismail, Dr. Yaacob Merican, Dr. Hans von Sponeck.

Working in liaison with their Malaysian counterparts, commissioners Dr. Denis Halliday, former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization were present in Kuala Lumpur throughout the proceedings.

This important judicial process has received very little coverage in the Western media. Global Research will be publishing several reports following this historic judgment against the State of Israel.

Selected Excerpts

2 Prosecution’s Case

The Prosecution’s case against the first Defendant is that the first Defendant had committed War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide in his capacity as the Commanding Israeli General in military control of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Israeli-occupied Lebanon in September of 1982 when he knowingly facilitated and permitted the large-scale Massacre of the Residents of those two camps. These crimes were in violation of, inter alia, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the 1948 Genocide Convention, jus cogens, International Humanitarian Law; and Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the Charter of the Kuala Lumpur Foundation to Criminalise War.

The Prosecution’s case against the second Defendant is that from 1948 and continuing to date the State of Israel had systematically carried out against the Palestinian people a series of acts namely killing, causing serious bodily harm and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction – with the intention of destroying in whole or in part the Palestinian people.

These acts constitute the Crime of Genocide under international law including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 1948 (‘the Genocide Convention’) in particular Article II and punishable under Article III of the said Convention. It also constitutes the crime of genocide as stipulated in Article 10 of the Charter of the Kuala Lumpur Foundation to Criminalise War.

In his opening statement, the Chief Prosecutor Prof Gurdial Singh said that the Prosecution will adduce evidence to prove the counts in the indictment through oral and written testimonies of victims, witnesses, historical records, narrative in books and authoritative commentaries, resolutions of the United Nations and reports of international bodies.

6. The Defence case

Mr. Jason Kay Kit Leon of the Amicus Curiae-Defence Team submitted that in the charges against the two Defendants, the Prosecution had listed war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. Apparently the Prosecution had abandoned these charges, concentrating only on genocide.

He said that the offence of genocide is defined in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention 1948, whilst the OED defines it simply as “the deliberate killing of a large group of people, especially those of a particular nation or ethnic group”.

He submitted that the charge of genocide is unique; it means that you don’t like a group, you kill them; you kill them in a grand manner. Genocide means that at the end of the act, you have a lesser number of victims than before the genocide started.

He further submitted that when one talks of “massive killing”, it is many hundreds of thousands to millions of people. To suggest that an isolated event, the unfortunate murder of 3,000 people (Sabra and Shatila) is the same as massive killing is almost disrespectful of the true horror of massive

killing (as in Rwanda, where 800,000 people were killed in 100 days).

With regard to the Kahan Report, the Amicus Curiae-Defence Team said that it also identified other people as being responsible, with two other names other than Yaron still alive. The question is why only Yaron was charged? Why was Defence Minister Ariel Sharon spared?

He also submitted that the PLO had repeatedly violated the July 1981 cease-fire agreement. By June 1982, when the IDF went into Lebanon, the PLO had made life in northern Israel intolerable through its repeated shelling of Israeli towns.

On Cast Lead, the Amicus Curiae-Defence Team submitted that the IDF had come out with two reports. The point is if you are going to kill people nilly willy, you do not report it.

On the issue of the wall, the Amicus Curiae-Defence Team submitted that the primary consideration is one of security of the Israeli settlers. The State of Israel has a duty to defend their lives, safety and well-being.

On the issue of checkpoints, the Amicus Curiae-Defence Team said countries have a right to immigration laws. With regard to Plan Dalet, the Amicus Curiae-Defence Team said that it is subject to divergent opinions, with historians on one side asserting that it was entirely defensive, while other historians assert that the plan aimed at an ethnic cleansing.

4. Prosecution's closing submission

In his closing submission, the Chief Prosecutor said that he had called 11 witnesses (some of whom had testified through Skype), tendered 15 exhibits and furnished several documents and reports to the Tribunal during the course of the proceedings.

He urged the Tribunal to bear in mind that this is a Tribunal of Conscience and the case before it is an extraordinary case, which Winston Churchill used to call as a "crime without a name".

He said that the Prosecution had provided evidence of facts which, examined as a whole, will show that the perpetrators had committed acts against the Palestinians, with intent to kill, cause serious bodily or mental harms and deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Palestinians as a whole or in part.

From the testimony of Prof Pappe (PW8) the Prosecution had shown that before 1948, before UN Resolution 47, there was already a plan in place to take over the Palestinian territory, and this plan would be activated the moment the British relinquished its mandate over the territory.

At that point in time, the Palestinians were on 94% of the land, with the Jewish population settling over a mere 6% of the land. Under the UN partition plan, more than 50% of the land was to be given to the Jews.

Plan Dalet might not legally be genocidal in form at its inception, but as it took shape the ethnic cleansing metamorphosed into killing, massacre and creating impossible conditions for life for the Palestinians – either they leave or they die. The Prosecution submits this is genocide within the meaning of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention.

On Sabra and Shatila, prosecution witnesses (PW1 and PW6) had testified that the Palestinian refugees in those camps had been killed by the Phalangists, aided and abetted by the Israelis who were in complete control of the two camps.

According to the Kahan Report, all of Beirut was under Israeli control, and there was clear symbiotic relationship between Israel and the Christian forces (the Lebanese Maronite Christian militia or the Phalangists or Keta'ib).

On Operation Cast Lead in 2008, the Chief Prosecutor said that the Israeli Defence Force had used all kinds of weapons,

including white phosphorus – which is an incendiary weapon. The use of incendiary weapons is prohibited under Protocol III on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons.

As a result of the Israeli occupation of Gaza, nowhere in Gaza is safe for civilians. 1.5 million Palestinians are now trapped in despair, their fragile economy ruined. Under the Dahiya Doctrine (October 2008), the complete destruction of Gaza is the ultimate objective, the whole place must be flattened.

The Prosecution submits that the cumulative effect of the actions taken by the Israeli government, as shown by the Prosecution witnesses and the several documents tendered to the Tribunal, have shown beyond reasonable doubt that Israel is guilty of the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention and the Charter of the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission (The Charter).

Co-Prosecutor Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, submitting on the first charge against Amos Yaron, said that Amos Yaron was the commanding officer in charge of the Israeli Defence Force, in charge of the area of Beirut, and camps Sabra and Shatila. He said there were two issues which he has to deal with – first, whether or not there was a large scale massacre of the 10 residents of the two camps, and second, whether or not Amos Yaron facilitated and permitted such massacre, in violation of international law and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Charter?

On the first issue, he submitted there was a large scale massacre, as testified by PW1. She was there, and she saw the massacre with her own eyes. There was corroborating testimony by PW6, and further acknowledged in the Kahan Report.

On the second issue, Amos Yaron was in charge, to ensure that there would be peace and law and order. The Kahan Report itself concluded that anybody who knew about Lebanon would know that by releasing the Phalangists into Beirut, there would be massacre. Surely, Amos Yaron, the General in charge, must have known that by allowing the Phalangists to go into the two camps, the massacre would take place. But he decided to do nothing.

He received the reports of the killing of women and children, but he did not check the report. He did not pass the report to his superiors. The co-prosecutor submits that by ignoring all this despite knowing the circumstances, he himself had the intention of causing the death of the people in the two camps.

10.3 Commission's Register of War Criminals

Further, under Article 35 of the same Chapter, this Tribunal recommends to the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission that the names of the two convicted parties herein be entered and included in the Commission's Register of War Criminals and be publicised accordingly.

10.4 The Tribunal recommends to the War Crimes Commission to give the widest international publicity to this conviction and grant of reparations, as these are universal crimes for which there is a responsibility upon nations to institute prosecutions.

10.5 The Tribunal deplors the failure of international institutions to punish the State of Israel for its crimes and its total lack of respect of International Law and the institutions of the United Nations. It urges the Commission to use all means to publicise this judgement and in particular with respect to the Parliaments and Legislative Assemblies of the major powers such as members of the G8 and to urge these countries to intervene and put an end to the colonialist and racist policies of the State of Israel and its supporters.

[Read Complete Judgment \(pdf\) <http://www.globalresearch.ca/israel-charged-with-war-crimes-and-genocide-complete-judgment-of-kl-tribunal/5359433>](http://www.globalresearch.ca/israel-charged-with-war-crimes-and-genocide-complete-judgment-of-kl-tribunal/5359433)

Walter Kaufmann:

The Hegel Myth and Its Method

Source: *From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy* by Walter Kaufmann, Beacon Press, Boston 1959, page 88-119, Chapter 7: The Hegel Myth and Its Method; Transcribed: by Kai Froeb.

1. Hegel's importance.

Hegel was not a pagan like Shakespeare and Goethe but a philosopher who considered himself Christian and tried to do from a Protestant point of view what Aquinas had attempted six hundred years earlier: he sought to fashion a synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christianity, making full use of the labors of his predecessors. Among these he counted not only the great philosophers from Heraclitus and Plato down to Kant, Fichte, and Schelling but also such world-historic individuals as Paul and the men who had made the French Revolution. As he saw it, philosophy did not stand between religion and poetry but above both. Philosophy was, according to him, its age comprehended in thought, and — to exaggerate a little — the philosopher's task was to comprehend what the religious person and the poet feel.

Hegel's enormous importance becomes clear as soon as we reflect on his historic role. There is, first, his direct influence, which appears not only in philosophic idealism, which, at the turn of the last century, dominated British and American philosophy — Bradley, Bosanquet, McTaggart, T. H. Green, and Royce, to give but five examples — but also in almost all subsequent histories of philosophy, beginning with the epoch-making works of Erdmann, Zeller, and Kuno Fischer. It was Hegel who established the history of philosophy as a central academic discipline and as part of the core of any philosophic education. It was also Hegel who established the view that the different philosophic systems that we find in history are to be comprehended in terms of development and that they are generally one-sided because they owe their origins to a reaction against what has gone before.

Secondly, most of the more important philosophic movements since his death have been so many reactions against Hegel's own idealism and cannot be fully understood without some grasp of his philosophy. The first two great revolts were those of Kierkegaard and Marx, who swallowed easily as much of his philosophy as they rejected: notably, his dialectic. Today Marx's dialectic dominates a large part of the total population of the globe, while Kierkegaard's has been adapted by some of the most outstanding thinkers of the free world, notably Heidegger and Tillich, Barth and Niebuhr.

Two later revolts against Hegelianism dominate English and American philosophy in the twentieth century: pragmatism and analytic philosophy. William James, though occasionally he attacked Hegel himself, reconstructed Hegel somewhat in the image of his Harvard colleague, Royce, who was then the outstanding American idealist; while Moore, at Cambridge, who was joined by Russell, led the fight against the influence of Bradley and McTaggart.

One of the few things on which the analysts, pragmatists, and existentialists agree with the dialectical theologians is that Hegel is to be repudiated: their attitude toward Kant, Aristotle, Plato, and the other great philosophers is not at all unanimous even within each movement; but opposition to Hegel is part of the platform of all four, and of the Marxists, too. Oddly, the man whom all these movements take to be so crucially important is but little known to most of their adherents; very few indeed have read as many as two of the four books that Hegel published.

Hegel is known largely through secondary sources and a few incriminating slogans and generalizations. The resulting myth, however, lacked a comprehensive, documented statement till Karl Popper found a place for it in his widely discussed book, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. After it had gone through three impressions in England, a revised one-volume edition

was brought out in the United States in 1950, five years after its original appearance.

2. Critique of a critic.

To explode the popular Hegel legend one can hardly do better than to deal in some detail with Popper's Hegel chapter. This involves a temporary departure from religion and poetry, but the development "from Shakespeare to existentialism" cannot be understood without some grasp of Hegel and some discussion of the widely accepted image of Hegel. Moreover, Hegel is so frequently mentioned in contemporary discussions that it is intrinsically worth while to show how wrong many widespread assumptions about him are. Thirdly, our study should include some explicit consideration of questions of method, and especially of common pitfalls. Finally, we shall have occasion, as we develop Hegel's actual views, to call attention to the religious roots of some of his most characteristic notions.

Those who nevertheless prefer to skip this chapter to pick up the thread in the next should at least take note of the author's awareness that gross falsifications of history are not the monopoly of Miniver Cheevy. Forward-looking liberals and even believers in "piecemeal social engineering," like Popper, often distort history, too. And so, alas, did Hegel.

A detailed critique of Popper's sixty-nine pages on Hegel may be prefaced with a motto from Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo*:

"I only avail myself of the person as of a strong magnifying glass with which one can render visible a general but creeping calamity which it is otherwise hard to get hold of."

The calamity in our case is twofold. First, Popper's treatment contains more misconceptions about Hegel than any other single essay. Secondly, if one agrees with Popper that "intellectual honesty is fundamental for everything we cherish" (p. 253), one should protest against his methods; for although his hatred of totalitarianism is the inspiration and central motif of his book, his methods are unfortunately similar to those of totalitarian "scholars" — and they are spreading in the free world, too.

3. Scholarship.

Although the mere presence of nineteen pages of notes suggests that his attack on Hegel is based on careful scholarship, Popper ignores the most important works on his subject. This is doubly serious because he is intent on psychologizing the men he attacks: he deals not only with their arguments but also — if not altogether more — with their alleged motives. This practice is as dangerous as it is fashionable, but in some cases there is no outright evidence to the contrary: one can only say that Popper credits all the men he criticizes, except Marx, with the worst possible intentions. (Marx he credits with the best intentions.)

In the case of Hegel, there is voluminous evidence that Popper ignores: beginning with Dilthey's pioneering study of 1906 and the subsequent publication of Hegel's early writings, ample material has been made available concerning the development of his ideas. There is even a two-volume study by Franz Rosenzweig, the friend of Martin Buber, that specifically treats the development of those ideas with which Popper is concerned above all: *Hegel und der Staat*.

Furthermore, Popper has relied largely on Scribner's *Hegel Selections*, a little anthology for students that contains not a single complete work. Like Gilson in *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (p. 246), Popper takes over such a gross mistranslation as "the State is the march of God through the world," although the original says merely that it is the way of God with the world that there should be the State, and even this sentence is lacking in the text published by Hegel and

comes from one of the editor's additions to the posthumous edition of *The Philosophy of Right*— and the editor admitted in his Preface that, though these additions were based on lecture notes, "the choice of words" was sometimes his rather than Hegel's.

Popper also appears to be unaware of crucial passages, if not entire works, that are not included in these Selections; for example, the passage on war in Hegel's first book, which shows that his later conception of war, which is far more moderate, was not adopted to accommodate the king of Prussia, as Popper maintains. The passage on war in Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, in the section on "The Ethical World," was written when Hegel — a Swabian, not a Prussian — admired Napoleon and was published in 1807, a year after Prussia's devastating defeat at Jena. Hegel's views on war will be considered soon (in section II); but questions of method require our attention first.

4. Quilt quotations.

This device, used by other writers, too, has not received the criticism it deserves. Sentences are picked from various contexts, often even out of different books, enclosed by a single set of quotation marks, and separated only by three dots, which are generally taken to indicate no more than the omission of a few words. Plainly, this device can be used to impute to an author views he never held.

Here, for example, is a quilt quotation about war and arson: "Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword... . I came to cast fire upon the earth... . Do you think that I have come to give peace on earth? No, I tell you... . Let him who has no sword sell his mantle and buy one." This is scarcely the best way to establish Jesus' views of war and arson. In the works of some philosophers, too — notably, Nietzsche — only the context can show whether a word is meant literally.

The writings of Hegel and Plato abound in admittedly one-sided statements that are clearly meant to formulate points of view that are then shown to be inadequate and are countered by another perspective. Thus an impressive quilt quotation could be patched together to convince gullible readers that Hegel was — depending on the "scholar's" plans — either emphatically for or utterly opposed to, say, "equality." But the understanding of Hegel would be advanced ever so much more by citing one of his remarks about equality in context, showing how it is a step in an argument that is designed to lead the reader to a better comprehension of equality and not to enlist his emotions either for it or against it.

Even those who would not reduce all philosophy to such analyses should surely grant the ambiguity of words like equality and freedom, good and God — and also that philosophers can be of service by distinguishing some of the different meanings of such terms instead of aping politicians by assuring us that they are heartily in favor of all four. Popper writes like a district attorney who wants to persuade his audience that Hegel was against God, freedom, and equality — and uses quilt quotations to convince us.

The first of these (p. 227) consists of eight fragments of which every single one is due to one of Hegel's students and was not published by him. Although Popper scrupulously marks references to Gans's additions to the *Philosophy of Right* with an "L" and invariably gives all the references for his quilt quotations — e.g., "For the eight quotations in this paragraph, cf. *Selections ...*" — few readers indeed will recall when they come to the Notes at the end of the book that "the eight quotations" are the quilt quotations that they took for a single passage. And Popper advises his readers "first to read

without interruption through the text of a chapter, and then to turn to the Notes."

Quilt quotations invite comparison with composite photographs. In a campaign for a seat in the U. S. Senate, one such photograph was used that showed one candidate shaking hands with the head of the Communist party. It matters little whether it was labeled in fine print "composite photograph."

To be sure, quotations and photographs that are not patched together may be grossly unfair, too; and in rare cases, composite ones might not be unfair. But a self-respecting candidate will not use patched-up photographs of his opponent; and a scholar should not use a quilt quotation to indict the men he criticizes.

5. "Influence."

No conception is bandied about more unscrupulously in the history of ideas than "Influence." Popper's notion of it is so utterly unscientific that one should never guess that he has done important work on logic and on scientific method. At best, it is reducible to post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Thus he speaks of "the Hegelian Bergson" (p. 256 and n. 66) and assumes, without giving any evidence whatever, that Bergson, Smuts, Alexander, and Whitehead were all interested in Hegel, simply because they were "evolutionists" (p. 225 and n. 6).

What especially concerns Popper — and many another critic of German thinkers — is the "influence" that the accused had on the Nazis. His Hegel chapter is studded with quotations from recent German writers, almost all of which are taken from *The War Against the West* by Kolnai. In this remarkable book Friedrich Gundolf, Werner Jaeger (Harvard), and Max Scheler are pictured as "representative of Nazism or at least its general trend and atmosphere." Kolnai is also under the impression that the men who contributed most "to the rise of National Socialism as a creed" were Nietzsche "and Stefan George, less great but, perhaps because of his homosexuality, more directly instrumental in creating the Third Reich" (p. 14); that Nietzsche was a "half-Pole" (p. 453); that the great racist H. S. Chamberlain "was a mellow Englishman tainted by noxious German influences" (p. 455); and that Jaspers is a "follower" of Heidegger (p. 207). It would seem advisable to check the context of any quotations from Kolnai's book before one uses them, but Kolnai generally gives no references. Popper writes:

I am greatly indebted to Kolnai's book, which has made it possible for me to quote in the remaining part of this chapter a considerable number of authors who would otherwise have been inaccessible to me. (I have not, however, always followed the wording of Kolnai's translations.)

He evidently changed the wording without checking the originals or even the context.

Popper uses quotation after quotation from Kolnai to point out supposed similarities with Hegel, but never stops to ask whether the men he cites had read Hegel, what they thought of him, or where, in fact, they did, get their ideas. Thus we are told that the idea of "fame is revived by Hegel" (p. 266), for Hegel spoke of fame as a "reward" of the men whose deeds are recorded in our history books — which would seem a trite enough idea that could also be ascribed to scores of sincere democrats — but Popper goes on: "and Stapel, a propagator of the new paganized Christianity, promptly [i.e., one hundred years later] repeats [*sic*]: 'All great deeds were done for the sake of fame or glory.'" This is surely quite a different idea and not trite but false. Popper himself admits that Stapel "is even more radical than Hegel." Surely, one must question the relevance of the whole section dealing with Stapel and other recent writers; this is not history of ideas but an attempt to

establish guilt by association on the same page — in the hope, it seems, that *semper aliquid haeret*.

It is also the height of naïveté . A quick dip into a good dictionary of quotations would have shown Popper a great many closer parallels to Stapel than he found in Hegel. Perhaps the most extreme, and also the most memorable, formulations are found in some poets whose influence would be hard to gauge. Shakespeare writes:

Let fame, that all hunt after in their lives,
Live register'd upon our brazen tombs.

And though these lines occur in one of his comedies, *Love's Labour's Lost*, he certainly did not think meanly of fame. Ben Jonson even went a step further in *Sejanus* (I, ii): "Contempt of fame begets contempt of virtue." And Friedrich Schiller voiced a still more radical view — in a poem that many German school children learn by heart, *Das Siegesfest*, which deals with the Greeks' celebration of their triumph over Troy:

*Of the goods that man has cherished
Not one is as high as fame;
When the body has long perished
What survives is the great name.*

For every Nazi who knew Hegel's remarks about fame there must have been dozens who knew these lines. Does that prove Schiller a bad man? Or does it show that he was responsible for Nazism?

Besides, Popper often lacks the knowledge of who influenced whom. Thus he speaks of Heidegger and "his master Hegel" (p. 270 and asserts falsely that Jaspers began as a follower "of the essentialist philosophers Husserl and Scheler" (p. 270). More important, he contrasts the vicious Hegel with superior men "such as Schopenhauer or J. F. Fries" (p. 223), and he constantly makes common cause with Schopenhauer against the allegedly proto-fascist Hegel, whom he blames even for the Nazis' racism — evidently unaware that Fries and Schopenhauer, unlike the mature Hegel, were anti-Semites.

Hegel's earliest essays, which he himself did not publish, show that he started out with violent prejudices against the Jews. These essays will be considered in the next chapter; but they are not represented in Scribner's *Hegel Selections* and hence were not exploited by Popper. Nor have they exerted any perceivable influence. When Hegel later became a man of influence' he insisted that the Jews should be granted equal rights because civic rights belong to man because he is a man and not on account of his ethnic origins or his religion.

Fries, who was Hegel's predecessor at the University of Heidelberg, has often been considered a great liberal, and Hegel has often been condemned for taking a strong stand against him; it is rarely, if ever, mentioned in this context that Fries published a pamphlet in the summer of 1816 in which he called for the "extermination" of Jewry. It appeared simultaneously as a review article in *Heidelbergerische Jahrbücher der Litteratur* and as a pamphlet with the title "How the Jews endanger the prosperity and the character of the Germans." According to Fries, the Jews "were and are the bloodsuckers of the people" (p. 243) and "do not at all live and teach according to Mosaic doctrine but according to the Talmud" (p. 251) of which Fries conjures up a frightening picture. "Thus the Jewish caste ... should be exterminated completely [*mit Stumpf und Stiel ausgerottet*] because it is obviously of all secret and political societies and states within the state the most dangerous" (p. 256). "Any immigration of Jews should be forbidden, their emigration should be promoted. Their freedom to marry should ... be limited... . It should be forbidden that any Christian be hired by a Jew" (p. 260); and one should again force on them "a special mark on

their clothing" (p. 261). In between, Fries protests: "Not against the Jews, our brothers, but against Jewry [*der Judenschaft*] we declare war" (p. 248).

This may help us to understand why Hegel, in the Preface to his *Philosophy of Right*, scorned Fries's substitution of "the pap of 'heart, friendship, and enthusiasm'" for moral laws. It would certainly have been unwise of the Jews to rely on Fries's brotherly enthusiasm.

Hegel's often obscure style may have evened the way for later obscurantism, but Fries's and Schopenhauer's flamboyant irrationalism was, stylistically, too, much closer to most Nazi literature. It does not follow that Fries influenced the Nazis. He was soon forgotten, till, in the twentieth century, Leonard Nelson, a Jewish philosopher, founded a neo-Friesian school that had nothing to do with Fries's racial prejudices. The one influential thinker whom Nelson succeeded in leading back to Fries was Rudolf Otto, the Protestant theologian, who is best known for his book on *The Idea of the Holy*. What makes that book so notable is its fine description of the "numinous" experience; but the confused discussion of "The Holy as an A Priori Category" and the romantic notions about "divining" are indebted to Fries.

Popper, though he has written an important book on *Die Logik der Forschung*, "The Logic of Research," does not find it necessary to check his hunches by research when he is concerned with influences in his Hegel chapter. He simply decrees that Hegel "represents the 'missing link,' as it were, between Plato and the modern form of totalitarianism. Most of the modern totalitarians are quite unaware that their ideas can be traced back to Plato. But many know of their indebtedness to Hegel" (p. 226). Seeing that the context indicates a reference to the Nazis and that all the totalitarians cited in this chapter are Fascists, not Communists, Popper only shows his ignorance of this brand of totalitarianism.

Hegel was rarely cited in the Nazi literature, and, when he was referred to, it was usually by way of disapproval. The Nazis' official "philosopher," Alfred Rosenberg, mentioned, and denounced, Hegel twice in his best-selling *Der Mythos des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*. Originally published in 1930, this book had reached an edition of 878,000 copies by 1940. In the same book, a whole chapter is devoted to Popper's beloved Schopenhauer, whom Rosenberg admired greatly. Rosenberg also celebrates Plato as "one who wanted in the end to save his people [*Volk*] on a racial basis, through a forcible constitution, dictatorial in every detail." Rosenberg also stressed, and excoriated, the "Socratic" elements in Plato.

Plato, unlike Hegel, was widely read in German schools, and special editions were prepared for Greek classes in the Gymnasium, gathering together allegedly fascist passages. In his introduction to one such selection from the Republic, published by Teubner in the series of *Eclogae Graecolatinae*, Dr. Holtorf helpfully listed some of his relevant articles on Plato, including one in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, which was Hitler's own paper. Instead of compiling a list of the many similar contributions to the Plato literature, it may suffice to mention that Dr. Hans F. K. Günther, from whom the Nazis admittedly received their racial theories, also devoted a whole book to Plato — not to Hegel — as early as 1928. In 1935, a second edition was published.

Whether Hegel did, or did not, influence the Nazis may not be particularly relevant to Popper's central theses in his book — but then most of his book is not. His often stimulating ideas are amalgamated with a great deal of thoroughly unsound intellectual history; and Section V of his Hegel chapter (eighteen pages) is representative of the latter. It is also

representative of scores of similar attempts by authors who have less to offer than Karl Popper.

6. Vituperation and allegation of motives.

Although Popper, in his introduction, speaks of "the application of the critical and rational methods of science to the problems of the open society" (p. 3), he writes about Hegel in the accents of a prosecutor who addresses a jury. He says of Fichte and Hegel, "such clowns are taken seriously" (p. 249); he demands, "I ask whether it is possible to outdo this despicable perversion of everything that is decent" (p. 244); and he denounces "Hegel's hysterical historicism" (p. 253; Cf. p. 269).

Hegel certainly has grievous faults. Among these is his obscure style, but it is dry and unemotional in the extreme. A detailed account of his almost incredibly unemotional style as a lecturer has been given by one of his students, H. G. Hotho, and is quoted in Hermann Glockner's *Hegel* (1, 440 ff.), and in Kuno Fischer's *Hegel*, too. If "hysterical" means, as Webster says, "wildly emotional," Popper deserves this epithet much more than Hegel. For all of Hegel's shortcomings, it seems wildly emotional indeed to say that "he is supreme only in his outstanding lack of originality" and was not even "talented" (p. 227). And "the critical and rational methods of science" could hardly establish Popper's contention that the philosophy of Jaspers is a "gangster" philosophy (p. 272). Nor is this proved by a note on "the gangster philosophy" in the back of the volume, which turns out to furnish us with a quilt quotation (see above) from Ernst von Salomon's book, *The Outlaws*, which bears no perceivable relation to Karl Jaspers — not to speak of Hegel.

Popper's allegation of motives is scarcely distinguishable from vituperation. Hegel is accused of "a perversion ... of a sincere belief in God" (p. 244), but no evidence whatever is given to substantiate this charge. "Hegel's radical collectivism ... depends on Frederick William III, king of Prussia" and his "one aim" was "to serve his employer, Frederick William of Prussia" (pp. 227 f.); and it is hinted that Hegel misused philosophy as a means of financial gain (p. 241); but Popper ignores the literature on this question, which includes, in addition to the volumes cited above, T. M. Knox's article on "Hegel and Prussianism" in *Philosophy*, January, 1940, and his discussion with Carritt in the April and July issues.

Hegel, we are told, "wants to stop rational argument, and with it, scientific and intellectual progress" (p. 235), and his dialectics "are very largely designed to pervert the ideas of 1789" (p. 237). When Hegel explicitly comes out in favor of the things that, according to his accuser, he opposed, this is called "lip service" (ns. II and 43). Thus Popper claims — like Bäumler in his Nazi version of Nietzsche — that the man whom he professes to interpret did not mean what he clearly said. Quilt quotations are used to establish a man's views, and his explicit statements are discounted when they are inconvenient.

In the name of "the critical and rational methods of science," one must also protest against such emotional *ad hominem* arguments as that Heidegger's philosophy must be wrong because he became a Nazi later on (p. 271), or that "Haeckel can hardly be taken seriously as a philosopher or scientist. He called himself a free thinker, but his thinking was not sufficiently independent to prevent him from demanding in 1914 'the following fruits of victory ...'" (n. 65). By the same token, one might seek to discredit Popper's philosophy of science by pointing to his treatment of Hegel, or Newton's physics by calling attention to his absorbing concern with

magic, which Lord Keynes has described in his *Essays and Sketches in Biography*.

Popper's occasional references to "the doctrine of the chosen people," which he associates with totalitarianism, show little knowledge of the prophets though a great deal of emotion, and his references to Christianity are also based on sentiment rather than the logic of research. He is "for" Christianity, but means by it something that is utterly at variance with the explicit teachings of Paul, the Catholic Church, Luther, and Calvin.

Hegel's rejection of the adequacy of conscience as a guide in moral questions is countered by Popper's parenthesis, "that is to say, the moralists who refer, for example, to the New Testament" (p. 262) — as if no crimes had ever been committed in the name of the New Testament. Julius Streicher, in his violently anti-Semitic paper, *Der Stürmer*, constantly quoted the Gospel according to St. John.

One of the most important criticisms of Popper's approach, and of the large literature that resembles his attack on Hegel, might be summed up by citing Maritain's epigram from *Scholasticism and Politics* (p. 147): "If books were judged by the bad uses man can put them to, what book has been more misused than the Bible?"

7. Hegel's metaphysics.

Two simple points may illustrate how thoroughly Popper misunderstands the whole framework of Hegel's thought. First, he claims that Hegel taught that "self-evidence is the same as truth" (p. 237), although Hegel's first book begins with the denial of this view and Hegel never changed his mind about this.

The second point is more important because Hegel has so often been misunderstood in this way. "Hegel believes, with Aristotle, that the Ideas or essences are in the things in flux; or more precisely (as far as we can treat a Hegel with precision), Hegel teaches that they are identical with the things in flux: 'Everything actual is an Idea,' he says" (p. 231). Yet one need not look farther than Royce's helpful article on Hegel's terminology in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* to find that "actual" is, in Hegel's work, a technical term (as its equivalent was in Plato's and Aristotle's), and that he very emphatically did not claim that Ideas — another technical term — "are identical with the things in flux."

The dictum around which these misinterpretations have been woven most persistently, beginning when Hegel was still alive, occurs in the Preface to his *Philosophy of Right* and reads: "What is rational, is actual; and what is actual, is rational."

This dictum is very similar to Leibniz's idea that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Without sympathizing in the least with either of these two ideas, one should realize that both are rooted in religion. In the third edition of his *Encyclopaedia* (1830; §6) Hegel himself said of his epigram:

These simple sentences have seemed striking to some and have excited hostility — even from people who would not wish to deny some understanding of philosophy, not to speak of religion... . When I have spoken of actuality, one might have inquired, without being told to do so, in what sense I use this expression; after all, I have treated actuality in an elaborate Logic and there distinguished it precisely not only from the accidental, which, of course, has existence, too, but also, in great detail, from being there, existence, and other concepts.

Alas, this passage was not included in Scribner's *Selections*; hence these distinctions are overlooked by Popper, who reiterates the popular myth that, according to Hegel, "everything that is now real or actual ... must be reasonable

as well as good. And particularly good is, as we shall see, the actually existing Prussian state.”

It would prevent some confusion if Hegel’s term *wirklich* were translated actual, seeing that he opposed it to potential rather than to unreal or nonexistent. An acorn, though certainly real enough in the usual sense of that word, is not, as Hegel uses that term, *wirklich*. Only that is actual in Hegel’s sense which fully realizes its own nature or, as Hegel might say, the “idea” of which most existent things fall short. And the Prussian state, though, according to Hegel, more rational than a state that is based on slavery, yet fell short in some respects, as his *Philosophy of Right* makes clear, of the “idea” of the state.

8. The State.

When Hegel speaks of “the State” he does not mean every state encountered in experience. Immediately after first offering his epigram about the rational and actual, he himself continued:

What matters is this: to recognize in the semblance of the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present in it. For the rational (which is synonymous with the Idea), in its actuality, also embeds itself in external existence and thus manifests itself in an infinite wealth of forms, appearances, and figures, shrouding its core in a multi-colored rind. Our consciousness first dwells on this rind, and only after that does philosophic thinking penetrate it to detect the inward pulse and to perceive its beat even in the external forms. The infinitely varied relations, however, which take shape in this externality ... this infinite material and its organization are not the subject matter of philosophy.

Thus Hegel would distinguish between the Idea of the State, which he means when he speaks of “the State,” and the many states around us. But the Idea, he claims, does not reside in a Platonic heaven, but is present, more or less distorted, in these states. The philosopher should neither immerse himself in the description and detailed analysis of various historical states, nor turn his back on history to behold some inner vision: he should disentangle the rational core from the web of history.

Hegel is not driven to “juridical positivism” and the approbation of every state with which he is confronted, as Popper supposes (p. 252): he can pass judgment. Hegel makes a sharp distinction between such philosophic judgment and the arbitrary criticisms that reflect personal idiosyncrasies and prejudices. This would not involve any difficulty if he were willing to restrict himself to internal criticism, pointing out the multifarious inconsistencies that are so striking in the utterances of most statesmen, in the platforms of most parties, and in the basic convictions of most people. Hegel, however, goes further.

He believes in a rational world order and in his ability to understand it. For him, life is not “a tale told by an idiot”; and history, not merely, although also, a succession of tragedies. There is an ultimate purpose — freedom — and this furnishes a standard of judgment.

A few quotations from the *Philosophy of Right* may illustrate this. “One may be able to show how a law is completely founded in, and consistent with, both circumstances and existing legal institutions, and yet is truly illegitimate and irrational” (§3). Hegel also speaks of “unalienable” rights and condemns, without qualification,

slavery, serfdom, the disqualification from holding property or the prevention of its use or the like, and the deprivation of intelligent rationality, of morality, ethics, and religion, which is encountered in superstition and the concession to others of the authority and full power to determine and prescribe for me

what actions I am to perform ... or what duties my conscience is to demand from me, or what is to be religious truth for me [§66].

According to the addition of Gans, the editor, Hegel remarked in his lectures in this connection that “the slave has an absolute right to liberate himself” (cf. also §77).

Hegel is not inconsistent when he writes: “the State cannot recognize conscience [*Gewissen*] in its peculiar form, i.e., as subjective knowledge [*Wissen*], just as in science, too, subjective opinion, assurance, and the appeal to subjective opinion have no validity” (§137). Conscience is fallible; and, while no government or church has the right to dictate to our conscience, no government can afford to recognize conscience as a legal standard. As several of his interpreters have pointed out, Hegel, when he wrote the *Philosophy of Right*, was concerned about the recent assassination of the poet Kotzebue by a student who was convinced that the poet was a Russian spy and deserved death.

We are bound to misunderstand Hegel when we apply his remarks about conscience within the framework of the Nazi state. It would be more pertinent if we thought of the German Republic before 1933 and of the conscience of Hitler. For by “the State” Hegel means one in which freedom is realized and “a human being counts because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, or the like” — and this “is of infinite importance” (§209; cf. §270 n.). Hegel would consider rational the conscience of an opponent of Hitler who recognized his own absolute right to make himself free and to realize his unalienable rights — but not the conscience of a fanatic impelled by personal motives or perhaps by an equally objectionable ideology.

It is no wonder that the Nazis found small comfort in a book that is based on the conviction that “the hatred of law, of right made determinate by law, is the shibboleth which reveals, and permits us to recognize infallibly, fanaticism, feeble-mindedness, and the hypocrisy of good intentions, however they may disguise themselves” (§258 n.). In his Preface, too, Hegel called the law “the best shibboleth to distinguish the false brothers and friends of the so-called people.” One may agree with Herbert Marcuse when he says in *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*: “There is no concept less compatible with Fascist ideology than that which founds the state on a universal and rational law that safeguards the interests of every individual, whatever the contingencies of his natural and social status” (pp. 180 f.).

In sum: Popper is mistaken when he says, like many another critic, that, according to Hegel, “the only possible standard of judgment upon the state is the world historical success of its actions” (p. 260). Success is not the standard invoked in the *Philosophy of Right* when Hegel speaks of “bad states.” “The State” does not refer to one of “the things in flux,” but to an Idea and a standard of judgment, to what states would be like if they lived up fully to their *raison d’être*. This reason is to be found partly “in a higher sphere” (§270) for which Hegel himself refers the reader to his system as outlined in his *Encyclopaedia*. The whole realm of Objective Spirit and human institutions that culminates in the State is but the foundation of a higher realm of Absolute Spirit that comprises art, religion, and philosophy.

The discussion of “the State” in the *Philosophy of Right* opens with the pronouncement: “The State is the actuality of the ethical idea.” If he were a Platonist, he would mean justice; but Hegel means freedom: not that freedom from all restraints which, at its worst, culminates in anarchy, license, and bestiality, but, rather, man’s freedom to develop his humanity

and to cultivate art, religion, and philosophy. He considers the State supreme among human institutions because he would subordinate all such institutions to the highest spiritual pursuits and because he believes that these are possible only in "the State." He himself says: "To be sure, all great human beings have formed themselves in solitude — but only by assimilating what had already been created in the State."¹⁴ One might nevertheless insist, as Hegel does not, that conformity should be discouraged beyond the necessary minimum, and one might dwell, as Nietzsche did half a century later, on the dangers of the State.

It would be absurd to represent Hegel as a radical individualist; but it is equally absurd to claim, as Popper does (p. 258), that Hegel's State is "totalitarian, that is to say, its might must permeate and control the whole life of the people in all its functions: 'The State is therefore the basis and center of all the concrete elements in the life of a people: of Art, Law, Morals, Religion, and Science.'" Popper's claim simply ignores Hegel's emphatic insistence on the sphere of "subjective freedom," which he himself considered a decisive advance over Plato. The quotation from Hegel, of course, does not at all prove the preceding contention: it means — and the context in the lectures on the *Philosophy of History* (Preface) makes this quite clear — that the State alone makes possible the development of art, law, morals, religion, and science. And Hegel's formulation here shows less the influence of Plato, whom Popper represents as a terrible totalitarian, than the impact of Pericles, whom Popper admires. The sentence Popper quotes could almost come from Thucydides' version of Pericles' most famous speech.

Hegel's philosophy is open to many objections, but to confound it with totalitarianism means to misunderstand it. Ernst Cassirer puts the matter very clearly in *The Myth of the State* (1946), a book dealing with much the same material as Popper's, but in a much more scholarly manner. His Hegel chapter ends: "Hegel could extol and glorify the state, he could even apotheosize it. There is, however, a clear and unmistakable difference between his idealization of the power of the state and that sort of idolization that is the characteristic of our modern totalitarian systems."

9. History.

Hegel, like Augustine, Lessing, and Kant before him and Comte, Marx, Spengler, and Toynbee after him, believed that history has a pattern and made bold to reveal it. All these attempts are controversial in detail and questionable in principle; but a sound critique of Hegel should also take into account his remarkable restraint: he did not attempt to play the prophet and was content to comprehend the past.

Popper says that his own book could be "described as a collection of marginal notes on the development of certain historicist philosophies" (p. 4); and, as we have seen, he accuses Hegel of "hysterical historicism." But according to Popper's definition, Hegel was no historicist at all: he was not one of those who "believe that they have discovered laws of history which enable them to prophesy the course of historical events." This addition to predictions is what Popper means by historicism (p. 5).

We are told that Hegel was guilty of historical and evolutionary relativism — in the form of the dangerous doctrine that what is believed today is, in fact, true today, and in the equally dangerous corollary that what was true yesterday (true and not merely "believed") may be false tomorrow — a doctrine which, surely, is not likely to encourage an appreciation of the significance of tradition [p. 254].

Hegel, of course, excelled in his appreciation of the significance of tradition; in his books and lectures he took for granted its essential rationality, and he condemned as arbitrary any criticism of the past or present that was not accompanied by an appreciation of the significance of tradition.

He did not maintain "that what is believed today is, in fact, true today" but insisted that many of his contemporaries, both philosophers and "men in the street," held many mistaken beliefs. And "what was true yesterday ... may be false tomorrow" is, in a sense, a commonplace — as when we take such statements as "it is raining" or "the Americans, while saying that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, including liberty, hold slaves" or "another war might well spread the ideals of the French Revolution, without endangering the future of civilization." The same consideration applies to many a generalization about a nation and about war.

Hegel did not believe that such propositions as "two plus two equals four" were true at one time but not at another; he thought that the truth comes to light gradually and tried to show this in his pioneering lectures on the history of philosophy. He emphasized not how utterly wrong his predecessors had been but how much truth they had seen; yet Plato's and Spinoza's truths were not "all of the truth" but were in need of subsequent qualification and amendment.

Hegel's approach is not amoral. Although he finds the aim of history in its "result" (p. 260) and considers the history of the world the world's court of justice (p. 233 and n., 11), he does not idolize success. His attitude depends on his religious faith that in the long run, somewhere, somehow freedom will and must triumph: that is Hegel's "historicism." Those of us who lack his confidence should still note that he does not believe that things are good because they succeed, but that they succeed because they are good. He finds God's revelation in history.

This point is best illustrated by Hegel's polemic against Von Haller in the *Philosophy of Right* (§258). Throughout, he tries to avoid the Scylla of that revolutionary lawlessness that he associates with Fries and the Wartburg festival and the Charybdis of conservative lawlessness that he finds in Von Haller's *Restauration der Staatswissenschaft*. He cites Von Haller (I, 342 ff.): "As in the inorganic world the greater represses the smaller, and the mighty, the weak, etc., thus among the animals, too, and then among human beings, the same law recurs in nobler forms." And Hegel interposes: "Perhaps frequently also in ignoble forms?" He then quotes Von Haller again: "This is thus the eternal, immutable order of God, that the mightier rules, must rule, and always will rule." And Hegel comments: "One sees from this alone, and also from what follows, in what sense might is spoken of here: not the might of the moral and ethical, but the accidental force of nature."

Popper quotes Hegel: "A people can only die a violent death when it has become naturally dead in itself" (p. 263); and Hegel continues, "as e.g. the German Imperial Cities, the German Imperial Constitution" (n. 77). Applied to the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, Hegel's remark makes sense, while his bold generalization invites criticism. But one should take into account that Hegel is in agreement with a religious tradition that extends from Isaiah to Toynbee.

Intent on dissociating Hegel from this religious tradition and on associating him with the Nazis instead, Popper fastens on Hegel's conception of world-historical peoples. He quotes (p. 258) Hegel's Encyclopaedia (§550) as saying that "the Spirit of

the Time invests its Will" in "the self-consciousness of a particular Nation" that "dominates the World." This would seem to be another instance where Popper improved a translation without checking the original (cf. section 5 above). The passage in the Encyclopaedia reads: "The self-consciousness of a particular people is the carrier of the current stage of development of the universal spirit as it is present, and the objective actuality into which this spirit lays its will." In Scribner's *Hegel Selections*, this becomes "... in which that spirit for a time invests its will." And in Popper, finally, we suddenly encounter "the Spirit of the Time." His profuse capitalization of nouns in his quotations from Hegel is apparently intended to make Hegel look silly.

Hegel goes on to say, though Popper does not quote this, that the spirit "steps onward" and "delivers it over to its chance and doom." His position depends on his assumption that ultimate reality is spiritual and that the spirit reveals itself progressively in history. The stages of this revelation are represented by different peoples, but by only one people at any one time.

This strange notion was adapted by Stefan George and, with the individual prophet in the place of a whole people, became part of the creed of his Circle:

In jeder ewe

Ist nur eim gott und einer nur sein kunder.

This idea that "in every epoch, there is but one god, and but one his prophet" is even more obviously false than Hegel's view; and it is doubly ironical because, even in the relatively small field of German poetry, George was no solitary giant but was eclipsed by his contemporary, Rilke.

Hegel's notion was surely suggested to him by the way in which the Romans succeeded the Greeks — and perhaps also the Greeks, the Persians; and the Persians, the Babylonians.

This people is the dominant one in world history for this epoch — and it can be epoch-making in this sense only once. Against this absolute right which it has to be the embodiment of the current stage of development of the world spirit, the spirits of the other peoples have no right, and they, even as those whose epoch has passed, do not any longer count in world history. ^[2]

Above all, Hegel was probably also influenced by the Christian conception of the relation of Christianity to Jew and Greek.

Hegel's conception is dated today: we know more than he did about the history of a great number of civilizations. We can no longer reduce world history to a straight line that leads from the Greeks via the Romans to ourselves; nor can we dispose of ancient Asia as "The Oriental Realm" and understand it simply as the background of the Greeks. We are also aware of ambiguities in the conception of a *Volk* or nation and should not apply such terms to the carriers of Greek or Roman civilization. We understand the flowering of medieval philosophy in terms of the interaction of Jews, Muslims, and Christians against a Greek background, and should not care to say who in that epoch represented the world spirit. Some of us have even lost all belief in a world spirit.

All this does not imply that Hegel's views are wicked or that his basic error is due to his alleged nationalism or tribalism. Toynbee's conception of separate civilizations is open to almost the same objections. (See chapter 19, section 5, below.)

With the exception of entirely isolated communities, no unit can be understood completely without reference to others. But any unit whatever, whether it be Western civilization, France, Athens, or the Burlington Railroad, can be made the object of a historical study. In each instance, one will introduce other

units as sparingly as possible and only to throw light on the history of the unit under consideration.

Hegel's whole conception of "world history" is arbitrary and amounts to an attempt to study the development of his own civilization. But here he was at one with almost all of his contemporaries and predecessors who were also under the influence of the Bible. For it is from the Bible that the Western idea that history has a single beginning and moves along a single track toward a single goal received its impetus and sanction. Today we are apt to be more agnostic about the beginning; we are bound to deny the single track; but we may once again think in another sense of the unity of world history — a unity that is established by the present confluence of hitherto independent streams.

Hegel was not impeded by the recognition that some of the ancestors of his own civilization had made their epoch-making contributions simultaneously. Homer may have been a contemporary of the earliest prophets; Thales and Jeremiah wrote at the same time; and Stoicism flourished while Christianity developed out of Judaism. Elsewhere, Confucius and the Buddha were contemporaries. A pluralistic perspective is needed, as is more respect for individual units. There is no single plan into which all data can be fitted, and Hegel was certainly something of a Procrustes.

Any attempt, however, to read into Hegel's conception of "world domination" an exclusively political or even military sense in order to link him with Hitler is quite illegitimate. It is doubly misleading when one does not emphasize that Hegel was not making predictions or offering suggestions for the future but was scrupulously limiting himself to an attempt to understand the past. Pedagogically, the single-track conception has the virtue of simplicity; and it is still adopted almost universally in the field of Hegel's primary competence — the history of philosophy.

10. Great men and equality.

Hegel's conception of world-historical peoples is closely related to his notion of world-historical personalities. Both notions are justifiable up to a point. Some peoples have had little effect on anybody outside themselves, while the Greeks and the Jews, for example, have affected the history of the world out of all proportion to their numbers. Similarly, Socrates and Caesar might well be called world-historical personalities.

It is the rankest emotionalism when Popper writes:

Glory cannot be acquired by everybody; the religion of glory implies anti-equalitarianism — it implies a religion of "Great Men." Modern racialism accordingly "knows no equality between souls, no equality between men" (Rosenberg). Thus there are no obstacles to adopting the Leader Principles from the arsenal of the perennial revolt against freedom, or as Hegel calls it, the idea of the World Historical Personality [pp. 266 f.].

Popper implies that we ought to be "for" equalitarianism; but if it involves the belief that no man can achieve anything that cannot be achieved by everybody else, too, it is simply silly. In any sense in which it is at all worth while, equalitarianism is entirely compatible with belief in great men.

According to Popper, Hegel twists equality into inequality: "That the citizens are equal before the law," Hegel admits, "contains a great truth. But expressed in this way, it is only a tautology; it only states in general that a legal status exists, that the laws rule. But to be more concrete, the citizens ... are equal before the law only in the points in which they are equal outside the law also. Only that equality which they possess in property, age, ... etc., can deserve equal treatment before the law... The laws themselves presuppose unequal conditions...

. It should be said that it is just the great development and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete inequality of individuals in actuality [p. 239].

The omissions in the Hegel quotation are Popper's, and Popper explains them in the very next sentence:

In this outline of Hegel's twist of the "great truth" of equalitarianism into its opposite, I have radically abbreviated his argument; and I must warn the reader that I shall have to do the same throughout the chapter; for only in this way is it at all possible to present, in a readable manner, his verbosity and the flight of his thoughts (which, I do not doubt, is pathological).

A look at the *Encyclopaedia* (§539) shows that Hegel is not "for" or "against" equality but tries to determine in what sense it can be embodied in the modern state.

With the appearance of the State, inequality enters; namely, the difference between the governing forces and the governed, authorities, magistrates, directories, etc. The principle of equality, carried out consistently, would repudiate all differences and thus be at odds with any kind of state.

It is in the following discussion that we find the sentence italicized by Popper, and it seems best to quote it without omissions and with Hegel's, rather than Popper's, italics:

Only that equality which, in whatever way, *happens to exist independently*, regarding wealth, age, physical strength, talents, aptitude, etc., or also crimes, etc., can and should justify an equal treatment of these before the law — in regard to taxes, liability to military service, admission to public office, etc., or punishment, etc.

Hegel's sentence, though hardly elegant, is carefully constructed and exhibits a crucial parallelism. Only those with equal wealth should be taxed equally; age and physical strength should be taken into account by draft boards; talents and aptitudes are relevant qualifications for public service; and so forth. Or should we have equal punishment for all, regardless of whether they have committed equal crimes? Should we induct children into the armed forces and exact equal taxes from the poor and the rich? Is it Hegel that is guilty of a "twist"?

To return to "great men": Hegel said, according to Gans's addition to section 318: "Public opinion contains everything false and everything true, and to find what is true in it is the gift of the great man. Whoever tells his age, and accomplishes, what his age wants and expresses, is the great man of his age." (Popper's "translation" of this passage [p. 267] makes nonsense of it: "In public opinion all is false and true...") Hegel's passage ends, in Popper's translation: "He who does not understand how to despise public opinion, as it makes itself heard here and there, will never accomplish anything great." Popper's italics as well as his comments appeal to the reader's prejudice in favor of the supremacy of public opinion, though he previously appealed to the prejudice in favor of the supremacy of conscience. These two standards, however, are very different; and Hegel recognized the fallibility of both because he did not believe, as Popper alleges (p. 237), that "self-evidence is the same as truth." Hegel argued, in the body of section 318, that "to be independent of [public opinion] is the first formal condition of anything great and rational"; and he had the faith that public opinion "will eventually accept it, recognize it, and make it one of its own prejudices."

In the above quotation from Gans's addition, Popper finds an "excellent description of the Leader as a publicist"; and since he has introduced it with a reference to "the Leader principle,"

one is led to think of the Führer and to consider Hegel a proto-Nazi. The quotation, however, is not at odds with a sincere belief in democracy and fits beautifully not only Franklin D. Roosevelt's "interventionism" but also Lincoln's great speeches; for example, "A house divided against itself cannot stand" or "With malice toward none; with charity for all." And it is true of Lincoln, too, when Hegel says of the world-historical personalities, "They were practical, political men. But at the same time they were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time — into what was ripe for development."

Hegel found that world-historical individuals are always propelled by some passion ("Nothing Great in the World has been accomplished without passion") and that their motivation is rarely entirely disinterested. The latter point he expressed in terms of "the cunning of reason." The individual may be motivated not only by profound insights but also by "private interests" and even "self-seeking designs." Alexander was passionately ambitious; but in the long run his private interests furthered Western civilization. The same consideration applies to Caesar and to Franklin D. Roosevelt; in *The American Political Tradition*, Richard Hofstadter has shown how Lincoln, too, was fired by political ambitions until he was elected president.

Popper links Hegel with "the fascist appeal to 'human nature' [which] is to our passions" and proposes that we call this appeal the "cunning of the revolt against reason" (p. 268). Yet he himself evidently believes that Napoleon, whose motivation was hardly entirely disinterested and whose methods could scarcely be approved by a devotee of "the open society," was furthering Western civilization to such an extent that the German uprising against him must be labeled "one of these typical tribal reactions against the expansion of a super-national empire" (p. 250).

11. War.

Without accepting Hegel's view of war, one should distinguish it clearly from the Fascists'. Three points may suffice here.

First, Hegel looks back, not forward. He is not less interested than Popper in "the furthering of civilization" (p. 268) but finds that our civilization has been furthered by any number of wars in the past; for example, the Greeks' war against the Persians, Alexander's wars of conquest, some of the Romans' wars, and Charlemagne's conquest of the Saxons. Believing that it is the philosopher's task to comprehend "that which is" — to cite the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* — and not to construct utopias, Hegel speaks of war as one of the factors that have actually furthered civilization.

Second, we should not confuse Hegel's estimate of the wars that had occurred up to his own time with a celebration of war as we know it today or imagine it in the future.

Third, Hegel's attitude is not fully comprehensible when considered apart from its religious roots. He considered all that is finite ephemeral. According to Gans's addition to section 324, he said: "From the pulpits much is preached concerning the insecurity, vanity, and instability of temporal things, and yet everyone ... thinks that he, at least, will manage to hold on to his possessions." What the preachers fail to get across, "Hussars with drawn sabres" really bring home to us. (Popper writes "glistening sabres" [p. 269]; and the change, though slight, affects the tone of the passage.)

These three points are sufficient to show how Popper misrepresents Hegel's view. "Hegel's theory," we are told, "implies that war is good in itself. 'There is an ethical element in war,' we read" (p. 262). This is a curious notion of implication: from Hegel's contention that "there is an ethical

element in war, which should not be considered an absolute evil" (§324), Popper deduces that Hegel considered war "good in itself." Hegel attempted to solve the problem of evil by demonstrating that even evil serves a positive function. He accepted Goethe's conception of "that force which would/Do evil evermore and yet creates the good" (see chapter 5, section 5, above). It is of the very essence of Hegel's dialectical approach to penetrate beyond such assertions as that war is good or evil to a specification of the respects in which it is good and those in which it is evil. Today the evil so far outweighs any conceivable good that we are apt to be impatient with anyone who as much as mentions any good aspects; but in a concrete predicament, the majority still feels that the good outweighs the evil, even if this point is made by speaking of "the lesser evil."

The one passage in which Hegel does consider the question of future wars is not well known and is worth quoting. It is found in his Berlin lectures on aesthetics:

Suppose that, after having considered the great epics of the past [the Iliad, Cid, and Tasso's, Ariosto's, and Camoëns' poems], which describe the triumph of the Occident over the Orient, of European measure, of individual beauty, and of self-critical reason over Asiatic splendor, ... one now wished to think of great epics which might be written in the future: they would only have to represent the victory of the living rationality which may develop in America, over the incarceration into an infinitely progressing measuring and particularizing. For in Europe every people is now limited by another and may not, on its part, begin a war against another European people. If one now wants to go beyond Europe, it can only be to America. ^[3]

In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel also hailed the United States as "the land of the future." ^[4] Plainly, he did not believe that world history would culminate in Prussia. His lectures on history do not lead up to a prediction but to the pronouncement: "To this point consciousness has come."

This may also be the clue to the famous expression of resignation at the end of the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* — a passage that, at first glance, seems at odds with the subsequent demand for trial by jury and for a real parliament with public proceedings, institutions then still lacking in Prussia. But apparently Hegel did not believe that Prussia, or Europe, had any real future: "When philosophy paints its grey on grey, a form of life has grown old, and with grey on grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only comprehended. The owl of Minerva begins its flight only at dusk."

12. Nationalism.

On this point Popper's account is particularly confused. "When nationalism was revived a hundred years ago [about 1850?], it was in one of the most mixed regions of Europe, in Germany, and especially in Prussia" (p. 245). A page later, we hear of "the invasion of German lands by the first national army, the French army under Napoleon." Three pages later we are told that Fichte's "windbaggery" gave "rise to modern nationalism." Fichte died in 1814. Contemptuous of the concept of nationality, Popper maintains that it is a common belief in democracy, "which forms, one might say, the uniting factor of multilingual Switzerland" (p. 246). Why, then, have the Swiss no wish to unite with any democratic neighbor? Popper's opposition to many features of modern nationalism is well taken; but those who are interested in its development, or who wish to understand it, will do better to turn to Hans Kohn's *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944) and to his chapter on "Nationalism and the Open Society" in *The Twentieth Century* (1949).

One of the major themes of Popper's Hegel chapter is that "Hegelianism is the renaissance of tribalism" (p. 226). Popper's use of "tribalism" and "nationalism" is emotional rather than precise, and he accuses Hegel of both. Even so he must admit that Hegel "sometimes attacked the nationalists" (p. 251). Popper cites Hegel's Encyclopaedia where the so-called nation is condemned as rabble:

and with regard to it, it is the one aim of a state that a nation should not come into existence, to power and action, as such an aggregate. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawlessness, demoralization, brutishness. In it, the nation would only be a shapeless wild blind force, like that of a stormy elemental sea, which however is not self-destructive, as the nation — a spiritual element — would be.

The Nazis concluded quite correctly that Hegel was unalterably opposed to their conception of the Volk and that his idea of the State was its very antithesis. ^[5]

Popper, on the other hand, is so intent on opposing Hegel that he immediately seeks to enlist the reader's sympathies on the nationalist side when he finds Hegel criticizing it. Thus Popper is not content to point out, quite correctly, that Hegel is referring "to the liberal nationalists" but must add, "whom the king hated like the plague." Hegel's attitude, of course, cannot be understood or reasonably evaluated in terms of the emotional impact of such words as "liberal" and "king." What is wanted is a profile of the movement condemned by Hegel; and that may be found in Herbert Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (pp. 179 f.):

There was much talk of freedom and equality, but it was a freedom that would be the vested privilege of the Teutonic race alone... . Hatred of the French went along with hatred of the Jews, Catholics, and "nobles." The movement cried for a truly "German war," so that Germany might unfold "the abundant wealth of her nationality." It demanded a "savior" to achieve German unity, one to whom "the people will forgive all sins." It burned books and yelled woe to the Jews. It believed itself above the law and the constitution because "there is no law to the just cause." The state was to be built from "below," through the sheer enthusiasm of the masses, and the "natural" unity of the Volk was to supersede the stratified order of state and society. It is not difficult to recognize in these "democratic" slogans the ideology of the Fascist *Volksgemeinschaft*. There is, in point of fact, a much closer relation between the historical role of the Burschenschaften, with their racism and anti-rationalism, and National Socialism, than there is between Hegel's position and the latter. Hegel wrote his *Philosophy of Right* as a defense of the state against this pseudo-democratic ideology.

The "liberal" Fries called for the extermination of Jewry (section 5 above), while Hegel denounced the nationalistic clamor against the extension of civil rights to the Jews, pointing out that this "clamor has overlooked that they are, above all, human beings" (§270 n.). Are we to condemn Hegel because he agreed with the king, or praise Fries because he called himself liberal?

13. Racism.

Popper's most ridiculous claim — and the last one to be considered here — is that the Nazis got their racism from Hegel. In fact, the Nazis did not get their racism from Hegel, and Hegel was no racist (see section 5 above).

The Nazis did find some support for their racism in Schopenhauer, with whom Popper constantly makes common cause against Hegel, and in Richard Wagner, who Popper eccentrically insinuates was something of a Hegelian (p. 228) though he was, of course, a devoted disciple of Schopenhauer.

Popper declares that one W. Schallmeyer, when he wrote a prize essay in 1900, "thus became the grandfather of racial biology" (p. 256). What, then, is the status of the rather better known and more influential Gobineau and Chamberlain and any number of other writers who publicized their views before 1900 and were widely read and constantly quoted by the Nazis?

Popper offers us the epigram: "Not 'Hegel + Plato,' but 'Hegel + Haeckel' is the formula of modern racialism" (p. 256). Why Haeckel rather than Bernhard Förster, Julius Langbehn, Hofprediger Stöcker, Chamberlain, Gobineau, or Wagner? Why not Plato, about whose reflections on breeding the Nazis' leading race authority, Dr. Hans F. K. Günther, wrote a whole book — and Günther's tracts on race sold hundreds of thousands of copies in Germany and went through several editions even before 1933? (See section 5 above.) And why Hegel?

Decidedly, Hegel was no racist; nor does Popper adduce any evidence to prove that he was one. Instead, Popper says: "The transubstantiation of Hegelianism into racialism or of Spirit into Blood does not greatly alter the main tendency of Hegelianism" (p. 256). Perhaps the transubstantiation of God into the Führer does not greatly alter Christianity?

One can sympathize with G. R. G. Mure when he says that the increasingly violent and ill-informed attacks on Hegel have reached a point in Popper's Hegel chapter where they become "almost meaninglessly silly."^[6] But familiarity with Hegel has waned to the point where reviewers of the original edition of *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, while expressing reservations about the treatment of Plato and Aristotle, have not generally seen fit to protest against the treatment of Hegel; and on the jacket of the English edition Bertrand Russell actually hails the attack on Hegel as "deadly" — for Hegel. Since the publication of the American edition in 1950, John Wild and R. B. Levinson have each published a book to defend Plato against the attacks of Popper and other like-minded critics, and Levinson's *In Defense of Plato* goes a long way toward showing up Popper's methods. But Popper's ten

chapters on Plato, although unsound, contain many excellent observations, and his book is so full of interesting discussions that no exposé will relegate it to the limbo of forgotten books. *The Open Society* will be around for a good long while, and that is one reason why its treatment of Hegel deserves a chapter.

What is ultimately important is not the failing of one author but the increasing popularity of the Hegel myth and of the methods on which it depends. To cite Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo* once more: "I only avail myself of the person as a magnifying glass with which one can render visible a general but creeping calamity which it is otherwise hard to get hold of."

Popper should be allowed the last word. And any critic of his work could do worse than to cite in his own behalf what Popper says to justify his own critique of Toynbee:

I consider this a most remarkable and interesting book... . He has much to say that is most stimulating and challenging... . I also agree with many of the political tendencies expressed in his work, and most emphatically with his attack upon modern nationalism and the tribalist and "archaist," i.e., culturally reactionary tendencies, which are connected with it. The reason why, in spite of this, I single out ... [this] work in order to charge it with irrationality, is that only when we see the effects of this poison in a work of such merit do we fully appreciate its danger [pp. 435 f.].

Notes

1. *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, ed. Lasson, p. 92; *Reason in History*, transl. Hartman, p. 51.
 2. *Philosophy of Right*, §347.
 3. *Werke*, ed. Glockner, XIV, 354 f.
 4. *Ibid.*, XI, 128 f.
 5. Cf., e.g., *Rosenberg's Mythos*, p. 527.
 6. *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, p. 360.
- <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/kaufmann.htm>

Robert Baines:
Hegel (and Wagner) in James Joyce's "Drama and Life."
***Journal of Modern Literature*; Summer 2012, Vol. 35 Issue 4, p1**

ABSTRACT

"Drama and Life," James Joyce's 1900 address to University College Dublin's Literary and Historical Society, can be said to be influenced by Hegel in two ways. Firstly, "Drama and Life" draws heavily on Richard Wagner's Hegelian essay "The Art-Work of the Future" (1849). Secondly, "Drama and Life" carries forward a definition of drama in Joyce's 1899 essay "Royal Hibernian Academy 'Ecce Homo'" that Joyce might have derived from Hegel's *Aesthetics*. Whether Joyce's understanding of drama in "Drama and Life" can be related either directly back to Hegel or indirectly to Hegel through Wagner remains a matter of critical controversy.

<http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/82542136/hegel-wagner-james-joyces-drama-life>

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[JOYCE, James, 1882-1941](#)
[WAGNER, Richard, 1813-1883](#)
[HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831](#)
[SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur, 1788-1860](#)
[UNIVERSITY College, Dublin](#)

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Was World War Two just as pointless and self-defeating as Iraq, asks Peter Hitchens

- 19 April 2008, a day before USA's Birthday [USA = Unser seeliger Adolf]

It makes me feel like a traitor to write this. The Second World War was my religion for most of my life.

Brave, alone, bombed, defiant, we, the British, had won it on our own against the most evil and powerful enemy imaginable. Born six years after it was over, I felt almost as if I had lived through it, as my parents most emphatically had, with some bravery and much hardship in both cases.

What do you think? Tell in the comments section at the bottom of the page

With my toy soldiers, tanks and field-guns, I defeated the Nazis daily on my bedroom floor.

I lost myself in books with unembarrassed titles like Men Of Glory, with their crisp, moving accounts of acts of incredible bravery by otherwise ordinary people who might have been my next-door neighbours.

I read the fictional adventures of RAF bomber ace Matt Braddock in the belief that the stories were true, and not caring in the slightest about what happened when his bombs hit the ground. I do now.

After this came all those patriotic films that enriched the picture of decency, quiet courage and self-mocking humour that I came to think of as being the essence of Britishness. To this day I can't watch them without a catch in the throat.

This was our finest hour. It was the measure against which everything else must be set.

So it has been very hard for me since the doubts set in. I didn't really want to know if it wasn't exactly like that. But it has rather forced itself on me.

When I lived in Russia at the end of the Soviet era, I found a country that made even more of the war than we did.

I even employed a splendid old Red Army veteran to help me set up my office there: an upright, totally reliable old gentleman just like my father's generation, except that he was Russian and a convinced Stalinist who did odd jobs for the KGB.

They had their war films, too. And their honourable scars.

And they were just as convinced they had won the war single-handed as we were.

They regarded D-Day as a minor event and had never heard of El Alamein.

Once I caught myself thinking: "They're using the war as a way of comforting themselves over their national decline, and over the way they're clearly losing in their contest with America."

And then it came to me that this could be a description of my own country.

When I lived in America itself, where I discovered that the Second World War, in their view, took place mainly in the Pacific, and in any case didn't matter half as much as the Civil War and the Vietnam War, I got a second harsh, unwanted history lesson.

Now here comes another. On a recent visit to the USA I picked up two new books that are going to make a lot of people in Britain very angry.

I read them, unable to look away, much as it is hard to look away from a scene of disaster, in a sort of cloud of dispirited darkness.

They are a reaction to the use - in my view, abuse - of the Second World War to justify the Iraq War.

We were told that the 1939-45 war was a good war, fought to overthrow a wicked tyrant, that the war in Iraq would be the same, and that those who opposed it were like the discredited appeasers of 1938.

Well, I didn't feel much like Neville Chamberlain (a man I still despise) when I argued against the Iraq War. And I still don't. Some of those who opposed the Iraq War ask a very disturbing question.

The people who sold us Iraq did so as if they were today's Churchills. They were wrong.

In that case, how can we be sure that Churchill's war was a good war?

What if the Men of Glory didn't need to die or risk their lives? What if the whole thing was a miscalculated waste of life and wealth that destroyed Britain as a major power and turned her into a bankrupt pensioner of the USA?

Funnily enough, these questions echo equally uncomfortable ones I'm often asked by readers here.

The milder version is: "Who really won the war, since Britain is now subject to a German-run European Union?"

The other is one I hear from an ever-growing number of war veterans contemplating modern Britain's landscape of loutishness and disorder and recalling the sacrifices they made for it: "Why did we bother?"

Don't read on if these questions rock your universe.

The two books, out in this country very soon, are Patrick Buchanan's Churchill, Hitler And The Unnecessary War and Nicholson Baker's Human Smoke.

I know Pat Buchanan and respect him, but I have never liked his sympathy for "America First", the movement that tried to keep the USA out of the Second World War.

As for Nicholson Baker, he has become famous only because his phone-sex novel, Vox, was given as a present to Bill Clinton by Monica Lewinsky.

Human Smoke is not a novel but a series of brief factual items deliberately arranged to undermine the accepted story of the war, and it has received generous treatment from the American mainstream, especially the New York Times.

Baker is a pacifist, a silly position open only to citizens of free countries with large navies.

He has selected with care to suit his position, but many of the facts here, especially about Winston Churchill and Britain's early enthusiasm for bombing civilian targets, badly upset the standard view.

Here is Churchill, in a 1920 newspaper article, allegedly railing against the "sinister confederacy" of international Jewry.

I say "allegedly" because I have not seen the original. I also say it because I am reluctant to believe it, as I am reluctant to believe another Baker snippet which suggests that Franklin Roosevelt was involved in a scheme to limit the number of Jews at Harvard University.

Such things today would end a political career in an instant.

Many believe the 1939-45 war was fought to save the Jews from Hitler. No facts support this fond belief.

If the war saved any Jews, it was by accident.

Its outbreak halted the "Kindertransport" trains rescuing Jewish children from the Third Reich. We ignored credible reports from Auschwitz and refused to bomb the railway tracks leading to it.

Baker is also keen to show that Hitler's decision to exterminate the Jews of Europe came only after the war was fully launched, and that before then, although his treatment of the Jews was disgusting and homicidal, it stopped well short of industrialised mass murder.

The implication of this, that the Holocaust was a result of the war, not a cause of it, is specially disturbing.

A lot of people will have trouble, also, with the knowledge that Churchill said of Hitler in 1937, when the nature of his regime was well known: "A highly competent, cool, well informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism."

Three years later, the semi-official view, still pretty much believed, was that Hitler was the devil in human form and more or less insane.

Buchanan is, in a way, more damaging. He portrays Churchill as a man who loved war for its own sake, and preferred it to peace.

As the First World War began in 1914, two observers, Margot Asquith and David Lloyd George, described Churchill as

"radiant, his face bright, his manner keen ... you could see he was a really happy man".

Churchill also (rightly) gets it in the neck from Buchanan for running down British armed forces between the wars.

It was Churchill who, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, demanded deep cuts in the Royal Navy in 1925, so when he adopted rearmament as his cause ten years later, it was his own folly he was railing against.

Well, every country needs men who like war, if it is to stand and fight when it has to. And we all make mistakes, which are forgotten if we then get one thing spectacularly right, as Churchill did.

Americans may take or leave Mr Buchanan's views about whether they should have stayed out, but the USA did very well out of a war in which Britain and Russia did most of the fighting, while Washington pocketed (and still keeps) most of the benefits.

Surveying Buchanan's chilly summary, I found myself distressed by several questions.

The First and Second World Wars, as Buchanan says, are really one conflict.

We went to war with the Kaiser in 1914 mainly because we feared being overtaken by Germany as the world's greatest naval power. Yet one of the main results of the war was that we were so weakened we were overtaken instead by the USA.

We were also forced, by American pressure, to end our naval alliance with Japan, which had protected our Far Eastern Empire throughout the 1914-18 war.

This decision, more than any other, cost us that Empire. By turning Japan from an ally into an enemy, but without the military or naval strength to guard our possessions, we ensured that we would be easy meat in 1941.

After the fall of Singapore in 1942, our strength and reputation in Asia were finished for good and our hurried scuttle from India unavoidable.

Worse still is Buchanan's analysis of how we went to war.

I had always thought the moment we might have stopped Hitler was when he reoccupied the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. But Buchanan records that nobody was interested in such action at the time. Nobody? Yes.

That includes Churchill, who said fatuously on March 13: "Instead of retaliating by armed force, as would have been done in a previous generation, France has taken the proper and prescribed course of appealing to the League of Nations." He then even more wetly urged "Herr Hitler" to do the decent thing and withdraw.

Buchanan doesn't think that Britain and France could have saved Czechoslovakia in 1938, and I suspect he is right.

But this is a minor issue beside his surgical examination of Britain's guarantee to help Poland in March 1939. Hitler saw our "stand" as an empty bluff, and called it.

The Poles were crushed and murdered, and their country erased from the map. Hitler's eventual defeat left Poland under the Soviet heel for two generations.

We then embarked on a war which cost us our Empire, many of our best export markets, what was left of our naval supremacy, and most of our national wealth - gleefully stripped from us by Roosevelt in return for Lend-Lease supplies.

As a direct result we sought membership of a Common Market that has since bled away our national independence.

Would we not have been wiser to behave as the USA did, staying out of it and waiting for Hitler and Stalin to rip out each other's bowels?

Was Hitler really set on a war with Britain or on smashing the British Empire?

The country most interested in dismantling our Empire was the USA. Hitler never built a surface navy truly capable of challenging ours and, luckily for us, he left it too late to build enough submarines to starve us out.

He was very narrowly defeated in the Battle of Britain, but how would we have fared if, a year later, he had used the forces he flung at Russia to attack us instead?

But he didn't. His "plan" to invade Britain, the famous Operation Sealion, was only a sketchy afterthought, quickly abandoned.

Can it be true that he wasn't very interested in fighting or invading us? His aides were always baffled by his admiration for the British Empire, about which he would drone for hours.

Of course he was an evil dictator. But so was Joseph Stalin, who would later become our honoured ally, supplied with British weapons, fawned on by our Press and politicians, including Churchill himself.

By Christmas 1940, Stalin had in fact murdered many more people than Hitler and had invaded nearly as many countries.

We almost declared war on him in 1940 and he ordered British communists to subvert our war effort against the Nazis during the Battle of Britain.

And, in alliance with Hitler, he was supplying the Luftwaffe with much of the fuel and resources it needed to bomb London.

Not so simple, is it? Survey the 20th Century and you see Britain repeatedly fighting Germany, at colossal expense.

No one can doubt the valour and sacrifice involved.

But at the end of it all, Germany dominates Europe behind the smokescreen of the EU; our Empire and our rule of the seas have gone, we struggle with all the problems of a great civilisation in decline, and our special friend, the USA, has smilingly supplanted us for ever. But we won the war.

• **Human Smoke**, by Nicholson Baker, is published on **May 6** by Simon and Schuster. **Churchill, Hitler And The Unnecessary War**, by Patrick Buchanan, is published on **May 13** by Crown Publishing.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article560700/Was-World-War-Two-just-pointless-self-defeating-Iraq-asksPeterHitchens.html#ixzz2wB6M4L11>

**Can't eat pork –
Swine flu...**



**Can't eat chicken –
Bird flu...**



**Can't eat Beef –
Mad cow disease...**




**Can't eat eggs –
Salmonella...**



**Can't eat fish –
heavy metal poisons in their waters.**



**Can't eat fruits and veggies –
insecticides and herbicides.**



Hmmmmmm!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

**M
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**I believe that leaves Chocolate and
ice cream!!!!!!!!!!
Remember - - - STRESSED
spelled backwards is
DESSERTS**



**Send this to four people and you will
lose 2 pounds**



**Delete it and you will
gain 10 pounds immediately!**



**That's why I had to pass this on - -
didn't want to risk it - - -
And I wanted to put
a smile on your face.**